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ABSTRACT 
 
Avram, Remus C. M.S.Egr., Departament of Electrical Engineering, Wright State 
University, 2012. A Unified Nonlinear Adaptive Approach for the Fault Diagnosis of 
Aircraft Engines. 
 
 
 
In this thesis, a fault detection and isolation (FDI) method is developed for aircraft 
engines by utilizing nonlinear adaptive estimation techniques. Engine sensor faults, 
actuator faults and component faults are considered under one unified framework. The 
fault diagnosis architecture consists of a bank of nonlinear adaptive estimators. One of 
them is the fault detection estimator used for fault detection, and the remaining ones are 
fault isolation estimators employed to determine the particular fault type/location after 
fault detection. Each isolation estimator is designed based on the functional structure of a 
particular fault type under consideration. The FDI architecture has been integrated with 
the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation (C-MAPSS) engine model 
developed by NASA researchers in recent years. Extensive simulation results and 
comparative studies are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the nonlinear FDI 
method.  
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Fault Detection and Isolation Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
It goes without say that the twentieth century has been the most dominant technological 
developed era of recorded human history. Among many great inventions and discoveries 
the invention of the first controlled, heavier than air aircraft, on December 17, 1903 by 
the Orville and Wilbur Wright, marked the beginning of an extraordinary journey in the 
technological evolution of human-controlled, powered flight. The driving forces of this 
development are the continuous growing demands in flight performance, effectiveness, 
safety, reliability and advanced controls and navigation systems.  The strong 
interdependency of these constraints plays a great role in the technological 
advancements and expropriates high attention to design detail. With a growing demand 
in the safety, reliability and longevity of aircraft engine models comes the need for an 
accurate and continuously improving engine health-monitoring (EHM) technology. This 
thesis will present a model-based approach of fault detection and isolation (FDI) for 
generic gas-path turbine aircraft engines. 
 
1.1.1 Model-based Fault Diagnosis and Isolation 
 
The common definition of a fault (see book [2] for instance) is “an unpermitted 
deviation of at least one characteristic property (feature) of the system from the 
acceptable, usual, standard condition” (Isermann p. 20). Faults can be caused by system 
malfunction or external agents and can sometimes be misidentified as a result of normal 
 2 
component degradation. The general guidelines for health monitoring and fault 
diagnosis point towards the detection and the classification/isolation of the occurring 
fault. A fault diagnosis system is a health monitoring system that yields as much 
possible information about the anomalous performance of the functioning components. 
Fault diagnosis (FD) carries the following responsibilities: 
• Fault Detection - represents the process by which the presence/occurrence of a fault is 
identified 
• Fault Isolation - represents the process by which the location of a fault is identified  
• Fault Identification - represents the process by which the magnitude and nature of the 
fault is established 
 
1.1.1.1 Fault Detection 
 
As the name suggests, model-based fault diagnosis is the procedure founded on a 
mathematical model of the process to be diagnosed. This method is derived from the 
popular hardware redundancy based fault diagnosis, which consists of the 
reconstruction of the system using identical (redundant) hardware components [9]. 
Unlike its precursor, the model-based FD makes use of current progress in computing 
technology substituting redundant hardware with software implementation of the 
mathematical model. Hence, the alternative denominations are known as software 
redundant or analytical redundant fault diagnosis. The general framework of the model-
based FD is shown in  
Figure 1. As seen, the process model runs in parallel with the actual process, being 
driven by the same inputs. Assuming enough information is known about the process, it 
 3 
can be shown that the reconstructed model will mimic and approximate the real values 
of the process under fault-free conditions. If a fault occurs in the process, the residual 
(difference signal between process and process model) will be nonzero, indicating the 
presence of a fault. This systematization is also known as residual generation and is 
common to several model-based FD architectures [9]. Furthermore, for identification 
and isolation purposes residual evaluation is applied by means of robust thresholds 
designed around the expected residuals [9, 10]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Model-based fault diagnosis architecture. 
 
Model-based FD architectures have been researched and studied since the 1970’s; a few 
paramount model-based fault diagnosis and isolation schemes stand out: 
• Parameter Identification Based Methods 
• Observer-based Fault Detection 
• Fault Detection with Parity Equations 
 
 
 
Controller Process 
Model 
Residual 
Evaluation 
inputs outputs 
residuals 
- 
+ 
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A. Parameter Identification Based Methods 
 
 
The parameter estimation method is based on the assumptions that parameters of the 
plant are affected by the fault and therefore they alter their values only under abnormal 
operating conditions. Derivations of error minimization designs are most commonly used 
to satisfy this approach. Figure 2 shows such an example and considers the least squares 
method. 
 
Figure 2. Parameter Estimation FD Architecture. 
 
 
Let a time-invariant process be described the following difference equation: 
         (1) 
Then the parameter estimation equation is given by (2): 
,                (2) 
y(k)+ a1y(k -1)+ ...+ amy(k -m)= b1u(k - d -1)+ ...+bmu(k - d -m)
Q̂k+1 = Q̂k +g (k)e(k +1)
Actual Plant 
Plant 
Model 
Adaptive  
Algorithm 
Reference 
input u   
- 
+ 
ε 
ε 
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where  is the parameter estimate row vector of the parameterized measure 
signal             , with . Hence the estimate model takes 
the form:              . The error signal ε is defined as:                 In the 
presence of a fault, it is evident that the parameter estimation error (       ) will 
diverge from zero value if one of the parameters of      changes their value. Moreover, 
the nonzero elements in                   can provide some insight about the 
nature of the occurring fault/event. There are a series of other parameter estimation 
methods (recursive least square, output error equation, etc. [9,10,11]) that have been 
extensively researched. The most common feature shared by these methods is that they 
all generally require sufficient process input excitation and are especially suitable for 
multiplicative faults [10]. 
 
B. Fault Detection with State Observers 
 
 
When a model of the process is known, state or output observer can be easily designed. 
Because of the specific design approach, state/output observers are commonly used for 
fault detection. For instance, consider the case of a sensor fault in a process represented 
by the state-space model given by equation (3): 
 
  
                  
                 
                 (3) 
 
Q̂
QT = [a1...an  b0...bm ]
 6 
 
Figure 3. State Observer FD Architecture. 
 
 
In equation (3) fM represents the additive fault in the output sensor. The observer 
equations are given by: 
                                    
                                                    (4) 
Hence, the output error signal is given by                  . It is clear that when a 
fault occurs, the output error signal becomes nonzero. When noise and modeling 
uncertainties are present, state transformations are used to decouple the unknown signals.  
 
 
 
 
Plant 
C 
A 
B    
L 
y(t) 
ey(t) 
     
u(t) 
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C. Fault Detection with Parity Equations 
 
 
Fault detection using parity equations, is a very similar form of the observer based FD 
scheme. The main difference is that FD is generally obtained based on input-output 
representation of the system. Consider the architecture shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Parity Equation FD Architecture. 
 
The plant dynamics are given by: 
              
    
    
  ,             (5) 
where        represents the change in the system dynamics as a result of faults, and is 
equal to zero under fault free conditions. The idea behind this method, as seen in the 
above figure, is to run a fixed model of the plant in parallel and analyze the residuals. 
Under fault-free operation conditions the residuals                           
           will be zero or limited by model uncertainty and noise boundary.  However, 
when        becomes nonzero (a fault occurs) the residuals reflect the change in the 
system as shown in (6): 
                                                                    (6) 
  
 
      
Plant 
Model 
+ 
- 
     
      
U(s) 
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1.1.1.2 Fault Isolation and Identification 
 
 
The purpose of fault isolation and identification is to provide as much information as 
possible about the occurring fault(s). Information extracted from residuals along with 
heuristic knowledge of symptoms and process enable different fault isolation and 
identification techniques. Fault diagnosis methods pursuing identification goals embody 
fault diagnosis with classification methods (pattern classification, Bayes classification, 
decision trees, neural network design, etc.) and fault diagnosis with inference methods 
(fault trees, approximate reasoning, hybrid neuro-fuzzy systems) [10, 11]. Derived from 
the analysis of residual signals, an array of residual-based isolation techniques can be 
achieved [27] :  
 Structured residual set 
 Fixed direction residual vector 
A structured residual set is achieved by the design of a set of residuals, sensitive only to 
one or a sub-set of faults. The sensitivity and insensitivity between residuals and the 
respective faults can be simply interpreted by the means of a decision table, as shown in 
Table 1. 
 Residual 1 Residual 2 Residual 3 
Fault 1 1 0 0 
Fault 2 0 1 0 
Fault 3 0 0 1 
Table 1. Dedicated Residual Design Truth Table Sample. 
This specific approach is known as a dedicated residual set. As can be seen from the 
above table, this setup allows for the isolation of multiple faults. However, this approach 
 9 
is very hard to achieve in practice, especially when limited information about the system 
is available. An alternative approach, to designing the residuals, known as the 
generalized residual set, is to make each residual sensitive to all but one fault. Easier to 
achieve in practice, this method enables only the isolation of single faults. 
 Residual 1 Residual 2 Residual 3 
Fault 1 1 1 0 
Fault 2 1 0 1 
Fault 3 0 1 1 
 
Table 2. Generalized Residual Design Truth Table Sample. 
 
Table 2 exemplifies on this approach. In both cases the logic can be interpreted as 
indicative if the respective residual lies above or below a certain threshold. For example, 
using the generalized residual approach, if residuals 1 and 2 lie above a set threshold, 
while residual 3 is bounded by the same threshold, it can be deduced that Fault1 
occurred. 
Complementarily, a space representation of the residuals can also be achieved for the 
purpose of fault isolability. Known as the fixed direction residual vector, this method 
relies on the representation of residuals corresponding to all possible faults, as a vector in 
the residual space. Specifically, each residual can be represented by: 
              ,                    (7) 
where αi is a scalar signifying the magnitude of the vector/fault, and li indicates the 
direction of the i
th
 fault in the residual subspace. Having a complete image of the fault 
signature space at each point in time, the isolation procedure follows to evaluate which 
fault vector the residual lies closest to. In the example shown in Fig. 4, the residual lies 
closest to the f1 fault signature, therefore the fault f1 is the most likely to have occurred. 
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Figure 5. Fixed Direction Resdiual Vector Fault Isolation [27]. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Aircraft Engine FDI Literature Review 
 
 
Considerable efforts have been made in the past, starting with the 1970s, to accomplish 
an efficient aircraft engine health management by means of analytical redundancy fault 
diagnosis schemes. The constraints of fault diagnosis systems evolve around the 
structural analysis (fault detectability, isolability and identifiability), modeling accuracy 
with respect to modeling uncertainty and robustness to noise and external disturbing 
signals. Efforts to enhance robustness to noise, disturbances and modeling error have 
been widely researched [14,16, 17], most commonly advocating decoupling techniques 
(implemented at the residual generation stage) or the design of adaptive thresholds 
(implemented in the decision making scheme).  
One of the earliest model-based FDI methods analyzes the system performance based on 
a quantifiable historical recorded flight data [6].  In Sallee et al. a set of recorded data is 
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analyzed for the purpose of studying the JT9D engine performance deterioration and its 
causes. The primary objectives of this method are to document historical trend of engine 
deterioration, quantify the levels of performance losses and identify the causes 
responsible. While this method can provide some insights into component 
interdependency and engine degradation profile, it is an offline method and thus, cannot 
be used as an in-flight health management monitoring system. High demand in fault 
detectability and isolability along with the need for online implementation pointed 
research towards parameter estimator techniques. Special attention has been paid to the 
use of Kalman Filter approaches in fault diagnostics literature. Although, various 
variations of observer based FD design has been accomplished [16, 19, 20, 21] and 
successfully implemented [17, 18], the Kalman Filter approach relies heavily on 
linearized models and is generally efficiently used only for sensor faults. 
Efforts to capture nonlinearities in the system dynamics with enhanced algorithm stability 
drove the design of Kalman Filter variations, such as the hybrid-Constant Gain Extended 
Kalman Filter (h-CGEKF) [22, 23]. The system model is updated periodically by the 
means of the hybrid KF in order to adjust for engine degradation pattern. The resulting 
theory has been applied for a fault identification scheme of abrupt faults within sensors 
and actuators, using a bank of Kalman filters architecture [22, 23]. Subsequently, it has 
been found this approach to be susceptible to “relative large” power lever angle (PLA) 
movements, triggering false alarms and inconclusive in the case of PLA transients, 
reiterating the dependency of the KF approach on linearized model operating at steady 
state conditions. An alternative methodology employs the use of Neural Networks, which 
features fast numerical solutions once the network has been trained [24, 25]. The NN 
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approach reduces to a pattern recognition problem, where the patterns insinuate the 
different regions of the system response to different faults.  Efforts to enhance multiple 
faults detection are shown in [26] where a bank of fault detection estimators is used. The 
model is comprised of N+1 FDEs, with each one corresponding to a fault signature plus a 
fault-free model. The analytical model is linearized based on fuzzy interpolation between 
operating conditions and requires extensive computational power due to its architecture.  
Table 3. illustrates  the benefits and drawbacks comparison of the two most common 
fault diagnostic techniques approaches as surveyed by Volponi et al. [24]. 
 
Method Benefits Disadvantages 
Kalman Filter • accurate and robust 
• historically successful 
• easy to configure 
• requires a reasonable approximated 
known linear model 
• highly dependent on accurate 
input/output information 
Neural Network • exploitable when model 
information is scarce 
• once trained, provides 
fast and easily attainable 
numerical solutions 
• uses influence coefficients as primary 
linear model 
• data training must be performed offline 
• requires retraining if engine 
configuration changes 
 
 
Table 3.  Advantages and disadvantages of KF and NN FDI architectures 
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1.3 Research Motivation 
 
National Transportation Safety Board accident data covering 7,571 US-registered aircraft 
from 1980 to 2001, categorized by accident cause, reveals that 52 % of the hardware-
induced accidents were related to aircraft system malfunctions, and 36% of these 
accidents were caused by propulsion system component malfunctions [28]. Advanced 
fault diagnosis schemes for aircraft engines can potentially help to significantly improve 
flight safety by enabling early detection and isolation of faulty conditions. 
An important area of propulsion health management (PHM) is sensor validation. Sensor 
faults may lead to poor regulation or tracking performance, or even affect the stability of 
control system. Moreover, faulty sensor output may also cause inaccurate 
diagnostic/prognostic results, resulting in unnecessary replacement of system components 
or mission abortion. One of the most difficult problems in sensor validation is that, in 
many practical systems both the system components (i.e., actuators and the controlled 
process/plant) and sensors are prone to faults. For instance, certain propulsion system 
components may fail as a result of damage due to harsh operating conditions or combat. 
Many existing PHM methods deal with component faults and sensor faults separately. 
Specifically, when dealing with sensor validation, people usually assume there are no 
component faults; when dealing with component faults, people often assume there are no 
sensor faults. In the former case, a component fault may be misinterpreted as sensor 
faults; in the latter case, a sensor fault may be misinterpreted as a component fault. Both 
cases may potentially lead to a high false alarm rate and unnecessary maintenance. 
Therefore, it would be ideal to address sensor faults and components faults under 
one unified framework. 
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In addition, many existing fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods for aircraft engines 
are based on the assumption that the system exhibits linear behaviors in the neighborhood 
of steady-state operating points, and therefore linearization-based diagnostic methods are 
often used [30, 31, 34, 35]. However, the dynamics of aircraft engines are highly 
nonlinear, especially during dynamic transient operations. Therefore, there is 
significant research interest in fault diagnostic methods that are directly based on 
the intrinsic nonlinearities of engine dynamics.  
In recent years, considerable research effort has been devoted to fault diagnosis of 
nonlinear systems under various kinds of assumptions and fault scenarios (see, for 
instance, the books [29, 27] and the references cited therein). The idea of using adaptive 
and learning techniques in fault diagnosis and accommodation has also been proposed. A 
nonlinear adaptive estimation based general methodology for robust fault diagnosis of 
nonlinear uncertain systems has been presented in [38, 4, 40, 41]. 
Based on the above discussions, underlining the strongest demands in the FDI 
architecture for engine health diagnostics, this thesis presents a unified (engine 
components and sensors) fault diagnosis and identification procedure based on the 
nonlinear dynamics of a jet engine model using adaptive estimation techniques. 
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Problem Formulation  
 
2.1  C-MAPSS Engine Model 
 
The NASA C-MAPSS engine model is a realistic representation of the nonlinear 
aerothermal dynamics of a 90,000-pound thrust class turbofan engine with high-bypass 
ratio and a two-spool configuration [1,32]. Figure 6 shows various components of the 
engine model. In this engine model, the rotating components consist of the fan, low 
pressure compressor (LPC) and low pressure turbine (LPT) on the fan shaft, and the high 
pressure compressor (HPC) and high pressure turbine (HPT) on the core shaft. The 
station designations are shown at the bottom of the figure. The state variables, health 
parameters, and actuators of the engine model are given in Table 3. Specifically, the C-
MAPSS model has two state variables, including fan speed (Nf) and core speed (Nc), and 
provides a group of health parameters that can be adjusted to simulate normal health 
degradation and faulty conditions. The simulation operates with a representative closed-
loop engine controller that regulates fan speed by manipulating three actuators (i.e., fuel 
metering valve, variable stator vane (VSV), and variable bleed valve (VBV)). The 
dynamics of actuators and sensors have also been considered in the simulation model [1]. 
Table 4 shows the complete set of sensors included in the simulation and their respective 
noise levels. 
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Figure 6 Diagram of the C-MAPSS Engine Components and Station Designation [4] 
 
State Variables Health Parameters Actuators 
Nf – fan speed 
Nc – core speed 
Fan efficiency 
Fan flow capacity 
LPC efficiency 
LPC flow capacity 
HPC efficiency 
HPC flow capacity 
HPT efficiency 
HPT flow capacity 
LPT efficiency 
LPT flow capacity 
Wf  - fuel flow 
VSV - variable stator vane 
VBV – variable bleed valve 
 
Table 3 State Variables, Health Parameters and Actuators 
 
Variables Description Std. Deviation 
Nf Fan Speed 0.3 RPM 
Nc Core Speed 1.5 RPM 
T24 LPC outlet temperature 2.2 
o
R 
T48 HPT exhaust gas temperature 2.2 
o
R 
Ps30 Combustor static pressure 2.8 PSI 
T30 HPC outlet temperature 2.2 
o
R 
 
Table 4   Sensor Descriptions and Noise 
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2.2 Engine System Model 
The nonlinear dynamics of the C-MAPSS engine model can be described by  
 
                                                      (8) 
                                                         (9) 
 
where   is the state vector (i.e., Nf and Nc),   is the input vector provided by the three 
actuators (see Table 3), y is the output vector (see Table 4), respectively. The model 
given by  
                                                        (10) 
                                               (11) 
represents the known nominal engine dynamics. While the healthy system is described by 
 
                                                                (12) 
              .                                          (13) 
 
The difference between the nominal model and the actual (healthy) system is due to the 
vector fields   and  , which represent the modeling uncertainties in the state equation and 
output equation, respectively. The changes in the system dynamics as a result of a 
component fault or an actuator fault are characterized by the terms                and 
               in (8) and (9) respectively. Specifically, the function           
denotes the time profile of the component fault or actuator fault which occurs at some 
unknown time   ,        and        represent the nonlinear fault functions in the state 
equation and output equation, respectively. The change in the system dynamics as a result 
of a sensor fault is characterized by            in (9). Specifically, the vector    
represents a sensor bias, and the function          characterizes the sensor fault time 
profile with unknown fault occurrence time   . 
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The modeling uncertainty   in (8) represents the changes in the engine dynamics as a 
result of normal component health degradation during a number of flights. Engine normal 
health degradation due to usage is an aging process that all aircraft engines will 
experience, and it should not be considered as a fault [20]. In the fault diagnosis 
literature, efforts to enhance the robustness with respect to modeling uncertainty can be 
achieved either at the residual generation stage by using decoupling techniques or at the 
residual evaluation stage by using adaptive thresholds [29, 27]. In the first approach, the 
modeling uncertainty is often assumed to be structured, which allows the use of linear 
and nonlinear state transformations to decouple faults from modeling uncertainty by 
assuming certain rank conditions satisfied by the distribution matrix of the structured 
modeling uncertainty. However, in many practical systems, the modeling uncertainty is 
often unstructured, which makes it very difficult to apply the decoupling method. This 
justifies the use of adaptive thresholds to achieve robustness at the residual evaluation 
stage. In the adaptive threshold approach [4, 40, 41], the modeling uncertainty can be 
unstructured but bounded by some suitable constant or function. This bound is used to 
derive thresholds for distinguishing between the effect of faults and the effect of 
modeling uncertainty. In this research, the modeling uncertainty  , representing normal 
engine health degradation in a number of flights, is unstructured, and hence the second 
approach is adopted. Specifically, we have the following assumption: 
Assumption 1. The modeling uncertainties represented by   and   are unstructured and 
possibly an unknown nonlinear function of  ,  , and  , but it is bounded by some known 
functional, i.e., 
  
 
           
 
       ,                                                              (14) 
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where, for       , and            the bounding function              and 
             are known, integral, and bounded  for all       in some compact region 
of interest. 
As described above, the modeling uncertainty   represents the deviation of the actual 
engine dynamics from that of a nominal engine model, which results from normal engine 
component degradation during a number of flights. It is expected that such deviation of 
engine dynamics is small for a number of flights, since normal health degradation 
progresses gradually with time. Therefore, the modeling uncertainty   can be represented 
by small changes in certain engine component health parameters. Based on flight test data 
[6, 39], the bounding function on the modeling uncertainty (i.e.,  
 
       ) can possibly 
be obtained by utilizing the knowledge of normal degradation of the health parameters 
under the worst case scenario during a number of flights. It is worth noting that, normal 
health degradation may accumulate over time during the engine's lifetime.  
As to the faults affecting the engine dynamics, the following 13 types of faults are 
considered in this research work: 
 Component faults in fan, LPC, HPC, HPT, and LPT, respectively, which are 
represented by certain unknown abnormal changes in the corresponding 
component health parameters given in Table 3. 
 Actuator faults associated with Wf and VSV, respectively, which are represented 
by unknown biases in the actuator output signals. 
 Sensor faults in the six sensor measurements as shown in Table 4, which are 
represented by certain unknown biases in the sensor signals.   
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We assume only a single fault is possible present at any time, which could be a 
component fault, an actuator fault, or a sensor fault.  
The class of sensor faults under consideration is represented by    in (9), where   is the 
fault distribution vector specifying the location of the sensor fault, and      is the 
magnitude of the possibly time-varying sensor bias. Because of the single fault 
assumption, the sensor fault distribution vector   has only one non-zero entry, which 
represents the corresponding corrupted output measurement. Depending on the location 
of the fault, the distribution vector   belongs to a class of six possible vectors 
            , where, for any            only the  th component of the vector    
takes the value of 1, while all the remaining components of     take the value of 0.  
As described above, we consider five types of component faults and two types of actuator 
faults, which are modeled by        in (8) and        of (9). Each of these seven fault 
types is assumed to be in the following form: for        ,   
 
                 
 
  
                        
 
      
 
 
 
                                         (15) 
 
                
 
                   
     
 
           
 
  
 
where       represents the unknown fault magnitude,   
 
 and   
 
 are known functions 
representing the functional structure of the  th fault affecting the  th state equation 
(       and  th output equation          , respectively. More specifically,       
represents the unknown changes in the corresponding component health parameters (i.e., 
efficiency and flow capacity) in the case of a component fault and the unknown bias in 
the actuator output in the case of an actuator fault, respectively.  
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The objective of this research is to detect the occurrence of any faults and to isolate the 
particular fault type. Note that the cases of abrupt faults and incipient faults are both 
covered in the above fault model. Specifically, the fault time profile functions           
and          in (8) and (9) take the form of a step function      given by: 
          
            
            
  
 
where       in the case of a component fault or an actuator fault, and       in the 
case of a sensor fault. Thus, the fault time profile is represented by the function     
   , while      and  
    represent the (possibly time-varying) fault magnitude. For 
instance, in the case of foreign object damage to the fan, the function         models 
the sudden and immediate effect of the damage, and       captures the progressing effect 
of the fault following the initial sudden damage.  
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FDI Algorithm 
 
 
A block diagram of the real-time engine fault diagnostic system is shown in Figure 7. 
Following the the general methodology in [4, 40, 41], the FDI architecture consists of a 
fault detection estimator (FDE) and a bank of fault isolation estimators (FIEs). Each FIE 
is designed based on the functional structure of a particular fault under consideration. 
Under normal operating conditions, the FDE monitors the system to determine the 
occurrence of any faults. Once a fault is detected, the FIEs are activated to determine the 
particular fault type that has occurred.   
 
 
Figure 7: Block diagram of the real-time engine fault diagnostic system 
  Block-diagram of the real-time engine fault diagnostic system 
 
3.1 Fault Detection Method 
 
In this section, we describe the design of the fault isolation method based on the 
healthy system model given by (12) and (13). By filtering each side of Eq. (12) with a 
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stable first-order filter 
 
   
  , where                                            , we 
obtain: 
  
   
 
 
   
             
        
   
   
 
  
The above equation can be rewritten as  
  
 
   
  
 
   
            
        
   
   
(16) 
 
  
By combing (13) and (16), we have 
   
 
 
 
 
 
        
   
         
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
(17) 
 
  
where 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
   
           
      
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
                                      (18) 
 
 
and    and    represent the 3
rd
 row and 6
th
 row of the output matrix C, respectively. 
In the absence of faults, the state variable x (i.e., Nf and Nc) in (18) can be implemented 
using the corresponding sensor measurement. In addition, the term           can be 
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obtained from a nominal engine model with no degradations (see (10 and (11)) even 
though its analytical form is not available. Therefore, the fault detection residual    
defined by (18) can be easily implementable. Based on (14) and (17), for each residual 
component, we have             with          where  
    
 
 
 
    
   
                      
   
   
   
                           
    
                                                                        
(19) 
 
According to the above discussions, we have the following  
Fault Detection Decision Scheme: A fault is detected when at least one component of 
the modulus of the fault detection residual               )  exceeds its corresponding 
threshold   . The fault detection time    is defined as the first time instant such that 
           , for some     and some          . 
  
3.2 Fault Isolation Method 
Now assume a fault is detected at      , the bank of FIEs is activated for the 
purpose of fault isolation. Each FIE is designed based on the functional structure of a 
particular fault under consideration. Below we describe the design of FIEs for component 
faults, actuator faults, and sensor faults, respectively. 
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3.2.1 Component and Actuator Faults Isolation Estimators 
 
Based on the system model given by (8) and (9), in the presence of a component fault 
or an actuator fault as defined by (15), the system dynamics become 
                                       
                             .  
 
Based on (15) and by using similar techniques as reported in the fault detection method, 
in the presence of  th fault type, we have 
               
 
   
 
 
  
 
   (20) 
 
where    is defined in (18) , and          
 
   
 
       
       
               
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
       
 
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and         
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
       
 
 
   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
. Therefore, based on adaptive estimation 
techniques [31, 33], the following FIEs corresponding to component faults and actuator 
faults are chosen: for        ,   
 
                                                               (21) 
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where         is the estimated fault magnitude (       for component faults, and 
      for actuator faults) associated with the  th FIE .  
The adaptation in the FIEs arises due to the unknown fault magnitude   . The following 
adaptive law for adjusting     is derived by using the Lyapunov synthesis method (see, 
for instance, [31, 33]) : 
 
                                                                            (22) 
  
where   is a symmetric and positive-definite learning rate matrix. In the presence fault 
type  , the learning algorithm given by (22) ensures the residual            generated 
by the matched  th FIE converges to zero in the absence of modeling uncertainty. In the 
presence of modeling uncertainty, robust adaptive learning algorithms such as projection 
modification and  -modification may be applied to the adaptive law (22) to ensure 
robustness [31, 33].  
 
3.2.2 Sensor Faults Isolation Estimators  
 
Based on the system model given by (8) and (9), in the presence of a sensor fault, the 
system dynamics become: 
                       
                        (23) 
                . 
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Now, let us first consider the case of a sensor fault in Nf or Nc. Based on the generalized 
observer scheme [29, 27], by utilizing all sensor signals except the Nf signal, the FIE 
corresponding to Nf sensor fault is designed as : 
                                                              
(24) 
 
        
where    is the estimated state vector,       consists of all the sensor signals except 
the Nf signal (i.e., Nc, T24, T48, Ps30, and T30), and     is the estimate of   , 
   consists of all rows of   except the first row which corresponds to the Nf sensor 
signal, the observer gain   is chosen such that (24) is an asymptotically stable observer 
for the nonlinear system (23) in the absence of faults and modeling uncertainty [36].  
Since the Nf sensor signal is not used to drive the above observer, the output estimation 
error                     should not be affected by the Nf sensor fault. In other 
words, in the presence of a fault in the Nf sensor, the residual        should still converge 
to zero in the absence of modeling uncertainty (or remain low in the presence of 
modeling uncertainty). On the other hand, in the presence of any other type faults under 
consideration, the residual        should be high since such faults will affect the observer 
dynamics or driving signals.     
Analogously, the FIE corresponding to the Nc sensor fault can be designed as a nonlinear 
observer utilizing all the sensor signal except the Nc signal. The corresponding residual 
                    should be sensitive to all fault types except the Nc sensor fault. 
Additionally, the FIEs corresponding to the remaining four types of sensor faults (i.e., 
T24, T48, Ps30, and T30) can be designed using a simpler method, since these signals do 
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not belong to the state vector. Specifically, based on (23) and by using similar techniques 
as reported in the fault detection scheme, it can be easily shown that   
    
 
   
 
 
    
 
  
  
 
 
 
where    is defined in (18), and the vector   takes the value of               , 
              ,               , or               . Obviously, in the presence of any 
of these four sensor faults, only one component of    would be affected. Thus, for the 
residual     (         corresponding to these four sensor faults, we simply choose 
          , where      consists of all components of the vector    described by                                       
(18) except the  th component.   
To summarize, based on the above design, for        , the residual     is only 
insensitive to the  th sensor fault. 
 
3.2.3 Fault Isolation Decision Scheme 
 
Now let us consider the  th component or actuator fault, where        , and the 
 th sensor fault, where        , in a unified framework. Then, we have 13 types of 
faults in the fault set. More specifically, for         , fault s is a component fault or 
an actuator fault, if      , and fault s is a sensor fault, if       . Thus, the fault 
isolation residuals        (for component and actuator faults) and        (for sensor faults) 
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can be represented under the unified framework as      ,         , where       
 
 
    , if        ; and              , if         .  
Due to the presence of modeling uncertainty, residuals are never zero even in the absence 
of faults. Moreover, the residual may change with the time-variant control inputs and 
dynamic engine operating conditions. Consequently, a small fixed threshold may result in 
false alarms, while a large fixed threshold may increase the number of missed 
detections/isolations. In the research, adaptive thresholds developed in [4, 40, 41] are 
utilized to enhance fault sensitivity and robustness. The design of adaptive thresholds for 
fault isolation is briefly described below. The detailed analysis can be found in [4, 40, 
41].  
As described in [4, 40, 41],  the adaptive thresholds for each FIE are designed in such a 
way that in the presence of a particular fault type  , where         , the residuals 
generated by all FIEs may exceed their corresponding thresholds, except for the matched 
 th FIE. More specifically, the fault isolation scheme is based on the following principle: 
for each particular fault  , a set of adaptive threshold functions    
     can be designed, 
such that the  th component of the residual vector       generated by the  th FIE satisfies 
  
       
    , for all        . Therefore, in the fault isolation procedure, if for a 
particular FIE  , at least one component of the corresponding residual vector exceeds its 
threshold (i.e.,    
       
     for some        ), then the case of fault type   having 
occurred can be excluded.  
Based on this intuitive idea, we have the following  
Fault isolation decision scheme: The occurrence of fault type   is concluded if the 
following two conditions are both satisfied: 
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a) All the diagnostic residuals, generated by FIE  , remain below their 
corresponding adaptive thresholds (i.e.,   
       
    , for all        ). 
b) At least one component of the diagnostic residuals generated by any remaining 
FIE  , where                , exceeds its corresponding threshold, i.e., 
  
       
    , for some          . 
The proposed fault isolation decision logic follows the generalized observer scheme 
(GOS) (Chen and Patton, 1999). Note that the residual generated by the matched isolation 
estimator is often the smallest one. Thus, the following isolation scheme is actually 
implemented: The fault type corresponding to the FIE with the smallest residual is 
considered to be the one that has occurred. Additionally, for any FIE, if at least one 
component of its residual exceeds the corresponding adaptive threshold, then its residual 
is set to a high value, hence excluding the occurrence the corresponding fault type.  
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Implementation 
 
 
4.1 Algorithm Implementation 
A prototype FDI software was implemented and integrated into the C-MAPSS engine 
model. As shown in Figure 8, the prototype software consists of one fault detection 
estimator (FDE) and 13 FIEs, one for each particular fault mode.  
 
Figure 8:  Components of the prototype FDI software tool 
Below we briefly discussed several additional technical issues involved in the 
implementation of the real-time fault diagnostic algorithm. First, it is not possible to 
obtain the accurate mathematical equations describing the normal engine dynamics, since 
such analytical forms does not exist in numerical engine simulations such as C-MAPSS. 
Specifically, the internal dynamics of the engine Simulink model is very complicated, and 
its analytical forms are not available for fault diagnostic design. What can be changed are 
the engine model's input signals and health parameters. Thus, the implementation is 
carried out by using additional engine Simulink models with modified inputs and health 
Engine
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parameters. For instance, the nominal dynamics of a new engine is obtained numerically 
by using an additional engine model running in parallel with non-degraded health 
parameters (i.e., with all the health parameter degradations set to zero) in open-loop 
mode.  
The modeling uncertainty resulting from normal engine degradation also affects the 
diagnostic residuals. A bounding function   on the modeling uncertainty   in (1) is 
required to implement the adaptive threshold for fault detection and isolation. The 
bounding function    can be obtained by utilizing the knowledge of possible normal 
degradation of health parameters under the worst case scenario during a number of 
flights. Based on historical test data [6,39], a 0.2% shift in each health parameter is 
considered to obtain the bounding function  . Since it is not possible to obtain the exact 
analytical form of   , it is obtained numerically based on two engine models running in 
parallel: one engine model with non-degraded health parameters (i.e., no modeling 
uncertainty) and the other engine model with 0.2% degradation (representing worst-case 
degradation in a number of flights) in selected health parameters (note that some health 
parameters may have canceling effects). As shown in Figure 9, xN and xD represent the 
state vectors generated by the engine model with non-degraded health parameters and the 
engine model with worst case degradation, respectively. 
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Figure 9 Method for generating the modeling uncertainty bound   
The C-MAPSS native environment is Matlab
© 
(The Mathworks Inc.). Figure 10 shows 
the implementation of the FDI block with the original C-MAPSS construct, as it appears 
in Simulink. As it can be seen the system is comprised of three main blocks: engine 
controller, engine model and the FDI block. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Implementation of the FDI Block with the C-MAPSS System 
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Simulation Results 
 
Extensive simulation studies have been conducted to validate the performance of the 
FDI algorithm. In particular, we have also implemented a least-squares-based fault 
classification algorithm [37] with help from NASA researchers and conducted various 
comparative studies between the nonlinear adaptive FDI method and the least-squares-
based fault classification algorithm.   
 
5.1 Least-Squares-Based Fault Classification Algorithm 
The least-squares-based fault classification algorithm assumes a linear relationship in 
the form of 
         , 
where    is the residual representing the deviation between the sensor measurement and 
its estimate obtained based on a linear engine model (see Figure 11) ,   is the unknown 
fault magnitude,   is a fault influence matrix, and   represents normally distributed 
measurement noise with zero mean. Therefore, the least squares algorithm can be used to 
estimate the unknown fault magnitude given the residual    and the fault influence matrix 
  [37]. The fault hypothesis corresponding to the smallest output estimation error is 
classified as the fault type that has occurred.  The fault influence coefficient matrix   
obtained using the fault detection residuals is shown in  
Table 5. 
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Figure 11 Block diagram used to generate residual for the fault classification algorithm 
 
Specifically, each column of Table5(a) corresponds to the steady-state values of the 
residual    in the presence of certain deviation in a particular health parameter under 
consideration (listed in the first row), and each column of Table 5(b) corresponds to the 
steady-state value of the residual in the presence of a bias in a particular actuator or 
sensor under consideration (listed in the first row).  The simulations are conducted at the 
operating condition of 36K ft, Mach 0.7, dTamb = 0, and PLA = 60 degree. Specifically, 
in order to generate the H matrix, an efficiency loss of 1% or a flow capacity loss of  1% 
are assumed for Fan, LPC and HPC, respectively; an efficiency loss of  1% or a flow 
capacity change of  1% are assumed for HPT and LPT, respectively;  a bias of -1 and  -
36.49 (approximately 1% of the steady state value) are used to generate the H matrix 
columns corresponding to actuator faults in VSV and Wf, respectively; a bias of 
approximately 1% of the steady-state value is used to generate the corresponding H 
matrix column for each sensor fault.  The residuals are normalized with respect to their 
steady-state values. Moreover, each entry is multiplied by 100 to represent percentage of 
change.          
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Table 5: Fault influence coefficient matrix 
(a) Fault influence coefficient matrix for components faults 
 
 
(b) Fault influence coefficient matrix for actuator and sensor faults 
VSV Wf Nf Nc T24 T48 Ps30 T30
Nf -0.0252 -0.3143 0.9639 -0.0178 -0.0432 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Nc 1.5346 -0.2302 0.0531 0.7139 0.0616 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T24 0.0107 -0.0987 -0.0047 0.0053 0.9891 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T48 0.0218 -0.3320 0.1041 0.0310 0.1223 0.9978 0.0000 0.0000
Ps30 0.0420 -0.6877 -0.1329 -0.0733 -0.1343 0.0000 0.9965 0.0000
T30 0.1562 -0.2223 0.0289 0.0041 0.0461 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000  
 
5.2 Comparative Studies 
We have conducted extensive comparative studies at various fault scenarios to verify the 
performance of the nonlinear adaptive FDI method. Specifically, in the comparative 
studies, the TRA is fixed at 60 degree. The fault occurrence time is assumed to be at 25 
second. The range of fault magnitudes considered is shown in Table 6. For the purpose of 
comparative studies, we define the following performance metrics: 
Percentage of Correct Diagnosis = (number of correct diagnosis) / (total number of 
diagnosis). 
Note that the online real-time diagnosis routine conducts fault diagnosis at every time 
step. Thus, the percentage of correct diagnosis should be 100% for a perfect diagnostic 
algorithm.  
Fan Eff Fan Flow LPC Eff LPC Flow HPC Eff HPC FlowHPT Eff HPT FlowLPT Eff LPT Flow
Nf -0.3142 0.5606 -0.0274 0.0132 -0.2307 -0.0319 -0.3271 -0.0640 -0.3350 0.0036
Nc 0.1124 -0.0517 0.0250 0.0471 -0.5841 0.5178 -0.8429 -0.1900 0.0918 0.4383
T24 -0.0710 0.1302 0.0532 -0.0975 -0.0066 0.0034 -0.0073 -0.0010 -0.1567 -0.0664
T48 0.0371 0.0920 0.0460 0.0089 0.6151 0.0678 0.9126 0.1890 -0.0267 -0.4322
Ps30 -0.0719 -0.0562 -0.0279 -0.0519 -0.7353 -0.0551 -1.1996 -1.4050 -0.0381 0.5371
T30 0.0303 0.0453 0.0483 -0.0271 0.2774 0.0870 -0.4448 -0.3212 -0.0350 0.1917
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Table 6 Ranges of fault magnitude considered 
 
 
 
Table 7 Labels of different fault types 
Fault Fan LPC HPC HPT LPT VSV Wf Nf Nc 
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Fault T24 T48 Ps30 T30 
Label 10 11 12 13 
 
Two cases are considered below: the case without modeling uncertainty resulting from 
normal degradation and the case with 0.2% deviation in each health parameter.   
 
 
 
Fan LPC HPC HPT LPT
Eff loss (%) [1, 7] [1, 7] [1, 7] [1, 7] [1, 7]
Flow capacity 
loss (%)
[1, 7] [1, 7] [1, 7] [-7, -1] [-7, -1]
VSV Wf Nf Nc
Bias + [9, 90] + [10, 100][1,3] [40,200]
T24 T48 Ps30 T30
Bias + [7, 56] + [1.5, 9][2,20] [3,30]
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5.2.1 Case without Modeling Mismatch 
 
The results of comparative studies between the least-squares-based fault classification 
algorithm and the adaptive FDI algorithm for the case of no model mismatch are shown 
in Table 6 to Table 18. The percentages of correct diagnosis of the two algorithms at 
various fault conditions are compared. Note that “ND” represents the case that a fault is 
not detectable. For instance, Table 8 shows the case of a fan component fault at various 
fault scenarios. Specifically, each of the fan efficiency loss and flow loss health 
parameters is varied from 1% to 7%, and the isolation performances of the two 
algorithms are compared at each of the 49 fault scenarios. The cases of other 12 fault 
types are shown in the remaining tables. As we can see, in general, the nonlinear adaptive 
FDI method gives better performance. In particular, the adaptive FDI has better isolation 
results for the fan fault, LPC fault, VSV fault, and NC sensor fault. Some representative 
case studies are described below.    
Figure 12 shows the case of a fan component fault (i.e., fault type 1) with an efficiency 
loss of 6% and a flow capacity loss of 3%. Specifically, the fault isolation results and 
fault magnitude estimates of the nonlinear  adaptive method and linear least-squares-
based fault classification method are shown in Figure 12(a) and Figure 12(b), 
respectively. As can be seen from Figure 12(a), the fault is correctly isolated as fault type 
1 (with an accuracy of over 97%) by the adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-
squares-based method often misclassifies the fault as a HPC fault (fault type 3), as shown 
in Figure 12(b). 
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(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 12:  Case of a fan component fault with an efficiency loss of 6% and a flow capacity loss 
of 3% 
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Figure 13 shows the case of a LPC component fault (i.e., fault type 2) with an efficiency 
loss of 6% and a flow capacity loss of 4%. Specifically, the fault isolation results and 
fault magnitude estimates of the nonlinear adaptive method and linear least-squares-based 
fault classification method are given in Figure 13(a) and Figure 13(b), respectively. As 
can be seen from Figure 13(a), the fault is correctly isolated as fault type 2 (with an 
accuracy of about 97%) by the adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-squares-based 
method is oftern confused with other types of faults (see Figure 13(b)). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 13:  Case of a LPC component fault with an efficiency loss of 6% and a flow capacity loss 
of 4% 
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Figure 14 shows the case of a VSV component fault (i.e., fault type 6) with a bias of 2. 
Specifically, the fault isolation results and fault magnitude estimates of the nonlinear 
adaptive method and linear least-squares-based fault classification method are given in 
Figure 14(a) and Figure 14(b), respectively. As can be seen from Figure 14(a), the fault is 
correctly isolated as fault type 6 by the adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-
squares-based method has much more misclassifications (see Figure 14(b)). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 14:  Case of a VSV actuator fault with a bias of 2 
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Figure 15 shows the case of a Nc component fault (i.e., fault type 9) with a bias of -30. 
Specifically, the fault isolation results and fault magnitude estimates of the nonlinear 
adaptive method and linear least-squares-based fault classification method are given in 
Figure 15(a) and Figure 15(b), respectively. As can be seen from Figure 15(a), the fault is 
correctly isolated as fault type 9 by the adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-
squares-based method is confused with other types of faults (see Figure 15(b)). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 15:  Case of a Nc sensor fault with a bias of -30 
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5.2.2 Case With Modeling Mismatch 
The results of comparative studies for the case of 0.2% deviation in each health 
parameter are shown in  
Table 21 to Table 33. As we can see, in general, the nonlinear adaptive FDI method 
gives better performance. In particular, the adaptive FDI has better isolation results for 
the fan fault, LPC fault, VSV fault, Nf sensor fault, and NC sensor fault. Some 
representative case studies are described below. 
 Figure 16 shows the case of a fan component fault (i.e., fault type 1) with an efficiency 
loss of 3% and a flow capacity loss of 2%. Specifically, the fault isolation results and 
fault magnitude provided by these two FDI methods are shown in Figure 16(a) and 
Figure 16(b), respectively. As can be seen from Figure 16(a), the fault is correctly 
isolated as fault type 1 by the nonlinear adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-
squares-based method often misclassifies the fault as a HPC fault (i.e., fault type 3) or 
Ps30 sensor fault (i.e., fault type 12), as shown in Figure 16(b). 
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(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 16:  Case of a fan component fault with an efficiency loss of 3% and a flow capacity loss 
of 2% 
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fault magnitude estimates of the nonlinear adaptive method and linear least-squares-based 
fault classification method are given in Figure 13(a) and Figure 17(b), respectively. From 
Figure 17(a), we can see that the fault is correctly isolated as fault type 2 by the adaptive 
FDI method, while the linear least-squares-based method is confused with other types of 
faults incluidng Ps30 sensor fault (fault type 12) and HPT fault (fault type 4), as shown in 
Figure 17(b). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 17:  Case of a LPC component fault with an efficiency loss of 1% and a flow capacity loss 
of 4% 
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Figure 18 shows the case of a VSV component fault (i.e., fault type 6) with a bias of 2. 
As can be seen from Figure 18 (a), the fault is correctly isolated as fault type 6 by the 
adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-squares-based method always classifies the 
fault as other faults (see Figure 18(b)). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 18:  Case of a VSV actuator fault with a bias of 2 
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Figure 19 shows the case of a Nf sensor fault (i.e., fault type 8) with a bias of 27. As can 
be seen from Figure 19(a), the fault is always correctly isolated by the adaptive FDI 
method, while the linear least-squares-based method approximately has a 
misclassificaiton rate of 47% (see Figure 19 (b)). 
 
 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 19:  Case of a Nf sensor fault with a bias of 27 
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Figure 20 shows the case of a Nc senosr fault (i.e., fault type 9) with a bias of -50. As can 
be seen from Figure 20 (a), the fault is correctly isolated as fault type 9 (with an accuracy 
of over 97%) by the nonlinear  adaptive FDI method, while the linear least-squares-based 
method is always confused with other types of faults (see Figure 20 (b)). 
(a) Nonlinear Adaptive FDI method 
 
(b) Linear-squares-based fault classification method 
 
Figure 20:  Case of a Nc sensor fault with a bias of -50 
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Conclusion 
In this report, a nonlinear adaptive estimation based FDI method is designed for detecting 
and isolating engine sensor faults, actuator faults, and components faults. The FDI 
architecture has been integrated with the NASA’s Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion 
System Simulation (C-MAPSS) engine model. Extensive simulation results have shown 
the effectiveness of the proposed FDI method.  
From the observed results a few potential topics for future research stand out. First and 
foremost, it would not only be interesting but also beneficial to validate the method, using 
real engine data. Furthermore, of special attention should be paid to the magnitude of the 
model uncertainty bound as described in (14). Specifically, as the normal engine 
degradation changes, the    term grows, which decreases the fault sensibility of the 
diagnostic method. A promising approach is the use of an adaptive engine model (i.e. 
neural network), which could periodically learn the new engine dynamics, due to normal 
engine health degradation. 
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1 Case without Modeling Uncertainty 
 
Table 8: Case of Fan component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND 87 86 96 95 96 100 
2% ND 99 97 100 100 99 100 
3% 98 88 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 44 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 82 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 47 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 98 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% ND 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 88 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 92 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 9: Case of LPC component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND ND ND 77 98 97 99 
2% ND ND ND 93 97 99 100 
3% ND ND ND ND 97 100 100 
4% ND ND ND 95 95 97 100 
5% 56 ND 13 75 97 100 100 
6% 86 72 27 55 84 99 100 
7% 62 87 75 24 87 95 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND ND ND 100 100 100 100 
2% ND ND ND 100 100 100 100 
3% ND ND ND ND 100 100 100 
4% ND ND ND 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 ND 42 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 75 97 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 99 36 100 100 100 
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Table 10: Case of HPC component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 88 58 90 90 92 94 
2% 100 100 100 98 67 83 88 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 98 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 11: Case of HPT component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 12: Case of LPT component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 13: Case of VSV actuator fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
Isolation 
Perc. 89 85 72 53 55 48 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 14: Case of Wf actuator fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -200 -160 -120 -80 -40 40 80 120 160 200 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -200 -160 -120 -80 -40 40 80 120 160 200 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 97 100 100 100 100 
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Table 15: Case of Nf sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -90 -81 -72 -63 -54 -45 -36 -27 -18 -9 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 91 
 
Fault Mag. 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 
Isolation Perc. 69 92 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -90 -81 -72 -63 -54 -45 -36 -27 -18 -9 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           Fault Mag. 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
Table 16: Case of Nc sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -100 -90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 
Isolation Perc. 2 5 1 15 12 16 40 21 ND ND 
           Fault Mag. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Isolation Perc. ND ND 33 40 39 49 44 75 63 46 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -100 -90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ND ND 
 
          Fault Mag. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Isolation Perc. ND ND 89 75 84 97 100 100 100 98 
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Table 17: Case of T24 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 
isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 85 
           Fault Mag. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
isolation Perc. 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           Fault Mag. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 18: Case of T48 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -56 -49 -42 -35 -28 -21 -14 -7 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 
         Fault Mag. 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 
Isolation Perc. 77 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -56 -49 -42 -35 -28 -21 -14 -7 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
         Fault Mag. 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 19: Case of Ps30 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -9 -7.5 -6 
-
4.5 -3 
-
1.5 1.5 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
10
0 
10
0 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -9 -7.5 -6 -4.5 -3 -2 2 3 5 6 7.5 9 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 95 100 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
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Table 20: Case of T30 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -30 -27 -24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 95 78 
           Fault Mag. 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
Isolation Perc. 59 93 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -30 -27 -24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           Fault Mag. 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Case with Modeling Uncertainty 
 
Table 21: Case of Fan component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 0 85 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 24 7 98 100 100 100 100 
4% 97 0 95 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 39 17 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 87 0 96 100 100 100 
7% 100 99 19 11 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 93 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 22: Case of LPC component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND 2 39 58 70 94 97 
2% 0 0 11 68 77 92 99 
3% 0 0 0 44 86 90 97 
4% 1 0 0 9 62 85 98 
5% 2 0 0 1 61 90 99 
6% 0 0 0 0 14 83 100 
7% 13 0 0 0 2 58 94 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% ND 0 63 92 100 100 100 
2% 4 0 0 61 100 100 100 
3% 27 0 0 44 100 100 100 
4% 100 0 0 0 31 100 100 
5% 100 0 0 0 0 98 100 
6% 100 3 0 0 0 47 100 
7% 100 21 0 0 0 0 100 
 
 
Table 23: Case of HPC component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 98 41 84 88 90 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 43 52 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 24: Case of HPT component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 25: Case of LPT component fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 74 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 86 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 69 98 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 87 97 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 73 98 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 74 97 100 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Eff./Flow 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 
1% 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2% 77 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3% 81 100 100 100 100 100 100 
4% 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6% 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 
7% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 26: Case of VSV actuator fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
Isolation Perc. 93 96 92 0 0 0 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 67 71 100 100 
 
 
Table 27: Case of Wf actuator fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -200 -160 -120 -80 -40 40 80 120 160 200 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 65 34 98 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -200 -160 -120 -80 -40 40 80 120 160 200 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 53 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 28: Case of Nf sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -90 -81 -72 -63 -54 -45 -36 -27 -18 -9 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 77 6 
 
Fault Mag. 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 
Isolation Perc. 0 0 36 49 53 70 91 95 97 97 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -90 -81 -72 -63 -54 -45 -36 -27 -18 -9 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           Fault Mag. 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 
Isolation Perc. 20 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 29: Case of Nc sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -100 -90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 
Isolation Perc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ND 
           Fault Mag. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Isolation Perc. ND ND 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -100 -90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 98 97 87 88 43 ND 
 
          Fault Mag. 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Isolation 
Perc. ND ND 55 54 48 64 67 70 91 89 
 
 
 
Table 30: Case of T24 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 
isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 50 13 2 
           Fault Mag. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
isolation Perc. 2 79 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           Fault Mag. 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 31: Case of T48 actuator fault 
(c) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -56 -49 -42 -35 -28 -21 -14 -7 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 92 18 ND 
         Fault Mag. 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 
Isolation Perc. 8 55 87 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
(d) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -56 -49 -42 -35 -28 -21 -14 -7 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 81 ND 
         Fault Mag. 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 
Isolation Perc. 71 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 32: Case of Ps30 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -9 -7.5 -6 
-
4.5 -3 
-
1.5 1.5 3 4.5 6 7.5 9 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 98 ND 100 100 100 
10
0 
10
0 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -9 -7.5 -6 -4.5 -3 -2 2 3 5 6 7.5 9 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 91 ND 100 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
 
 
Table 33: Case of T30 sensor fault 
(a) Least-squares-based fault classification method 
Fault Mag. -30 -27 -24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 
Isolation Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 85 76 30 9 1 
           Fault Mag. 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
Isolation Perc. 0 1 19 61 96 93 100 100 100 100 
 
(b) Adaptive FDI method 
Fault Mag. -30 -27 -24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 
Isolation 
Perc. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 27 
           Fault Mag. 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 
Isolation 
Perc. 94 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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